Comment les entreprises peuvent s'adapter aux nouvelles règles algorithmiques de tarification de New York

States are racing to rein in the growing use of artificial intelligence and computer algorithms to set prices, with New York leading the charge. On Dec. 15, a major amendment to New York’s antitrust law took effect, banning the use of certain algorithmic rent-setting tools for residential units under Section 340-b of the state’s General Business Law.

This follows New York’s November implementation of a first-in-the-nation disclosure law, Section 349-a of the General Business Law, that requires merchants to tell consumers when individualized prices are set using algorithms trained on personal data. State lawmakers are also considering S.B. 7033, which would outlaw algorithmic price discrimination based on protected characteristics like race and age.

These measures arrive amid a torrent of litigation challenging the use of algorithmic pricing software in contexts ranging from apartment rents to healthcare reimbursements, and as more companies adopt pricing systems that tailor offers to individual consumers.[1]

By pushing these laws, New York and other states seek to fill perceived gaps in the Sherman Antitrust Act and Robinson-Patman Act, the primary federal antitrust statutes prohibiting price-fixing and price discrimination.

Industry pushback has been swift: Multiple lawsuits are challenging the New York laws on constitutional and other grounds. The outcomes could determine not only the future of these statutes but the viability of similar regulations nationwide.

For businesses, this means both immediate new compliance burdens and continued uncertainty over how and whether these rules will ultimately be enforced.

The Algorithmic Rent-Setting Ban: Section 340-b

Section 340-b, enacted in October and effective Dec. 15, is the first state law barring the use of algorithms to set rents.[2]

The statute deems it an unlawful agreement in violation of New York’s Donnelly Act “for a residential rental property owner or manager to knowingly or with reckless disregard set or adjust rental prices, lease renewal terms, occupancy levels, or other lease terms and conditions” based on recommendations from algorithmic pricing software that performs a “coordinating function.”[3]

Notably, the law represents a potential expansion of liability beyond the federal Sherman Act, which requires proof of a horizontal agreement between competitors or potential competitors for a per se violation of the law. In contrast, the New York law deems the unilateral use of algorithmic pricing software to set or adjust rents and lease terms to constitute an unlawful agreement, even without a meeting of the minds between the landlords, provided the software performs a coordinating function.[4]

Further, the statute bars setting or adjusting rates using an algorithm, meaning a landlord could potentially violate the statute even if it does not reflexively adopt the recommended rent.[5] For example, landlords might arguably violate the statute by using algorithmic output as a default benchmark then adjusting the benchmark up or down to determine the actual rent.

This possibility represents a departure from some prior federal algorithmic pricing decisions, which dismissed complaints in part because the alleged conduct demonstrated that the defendants sometimes deviated from the algorithm-recommended price.[6]

Section 340-b is limited to algorithmic pricing software that performs a coordinating function. But the term “coordinating function” is defined broadly to include collecting past and present data on price and other factors from two or more competing property owners or managers, processing that data, and recommending rental prices or lease terms.[7]

The definition does not distinguish between algorithms that use confidential information or publicly available information. This too represents a meaningful departure from federal cases, which have generally treated algorithmic pricing based on public information as less problematic.[8]

Additionally, the statute does not require landlords to know they are using an offending pricing software. Instead, it is enough that they act with “reckless disregard.”[9] It is thus prudent for landlords to understand the mechanics of their software, as a lack of knowledge will not be a viable defense.

Landlords should also consider that software may fall within the covered definition even if coordinating rent prices is not its primary function. For example, one of the law’s sponsors indicated that the law could possibly apply to situations where “mom-and-pop style landlords” use ChatGPT or other AI tools to analyze data available on the internet to help them set rents.[10] While it is unclear whether courts would enforce the law in such a circumstance, landlords of any size should be aware of the potential risk.

In addition to prohibiting the use of certain software, the law makes it illegal for any person or entity to facilitate an agreement to not compete between residential rental properties, “including by operating or licensing” algorithmic pricing software that performs a coordinating function.[11] This provision plainly targets companies that make pricing software, but it may sweep in other actors who could be deemed to have facilitated an agreement.

It is unclear whether the statute requires proof of a predicate agreement to not compete for facilitator liability to attach, or if merely operating or licensing the offending software is enough. Given that the statute treats the use of such software to set rents as an unlawful agreement, a cautious approach is to assume that operating or licensing software used in that manner is sufficient to trigger the statute.

As to the new law’s geographic and temporal scope, Section 340-b adds a new provision to New York’s existing antitrust statute, the Donnelly Act. By its terms, the Donnelly Act applies to restraints on “business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state,” meaning there must be a nexus between the alleged conspiracy and injury to competition in New York.[12] The new law further specifies that the property owners and managers subject to the ban are individuals and entities that own or manage residential rental units in New York state.[13]

Although the law does not indicate whether it applies retroactively or prospectively, New York courts generally hold that “amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the Legislature’s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated” or the amendment is remedial in nature.[14]

Violations of the new law may result in civil penalties of up to $1 million, as well as potential criminal prosecution.[15] The Donnelly Act authorizes suits by the government and provides a private right of action, meaning this new section could create a basis for private plaintiffs to sue.[16] Parties suing under Section 340-b may be entitled to treble damages and attorney fees.

A Developing Challenge to Section 340-b

RealPage Inc., a company that provides pricing software to rental properties and recently entered a consent decree resolving a federal antitrust investigation, sued New York’s attorney general on Nov. 26 to block enforcement of Section 340-b.[17]

In its complaint, RealPage argues the statute violates the First Amendment by restricting lawful advice and analysis, imposing severe penalties, and discriminating based on viewpoint. The company seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the law is overbroad, unsupported by evidence and a threat to routine data-driven tools.

While RealPage’s preliminary injunction motion is still pending, the action’s outcome will have a large impact on the viability of Section 340-b and potentially other algorithmic rent-setting bans elsewhere.

Regulating Personalized Algorithmic Pricing: Section 349-a and S.B. 7033

In addition to legislative efforts aimed at restricting the use of algorithmic tools in rent-setting, New York has enacted and is considering further measures to regulate algorithms that leverage consumers’ personal data for individualized pricing. These legislative developments stem from heightened scrutiny of personalized pricing practices that have emerged in response to the proliferation of data-driven systems, particularly in industries like e-commerce, where algorithms dynamically adjust prices in real time based on consumer profiles and behavioral data.

Notably, New York’s Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act, codified at Section 349-a of the General Business Law, went into effect in November. The statute requires merchants to disclose when a published price has been set by an algorithm using a consumer’s personal data.[18]

The law recently survived a challenge brought by the National Retail Federation alleging that the disclosure requirement violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on compelled speech, though that ruling is under appeal.[19]

A second bill, New York S.B. 7033, the Preventing Algorithmic Pricing Discrimination Act, is currently under committee review. If enacted, this bill would prohibit the use of protected class data to set prices for goods or services that differ from those offered to other consumers. Protected class data encompasses information identifying legally protected characteristics, such as ethnicity, nationality, age, disability, sex or sexual orientation.

Unlike the Robinson-Patman Act, S.B. 7033 would regulate price discrimination in direct-to-consumer transactions and apply to both goods and services, thereby expanding protections to areas previously outside the reach of federal law.

Takeaways for Businesses

New York Property Owners and Managers

Property owners and managers within the state should:

• Réévaluer l'utilisation de logiciels ou de systèmes algorithmiques de tarification pour fixer les loyers, les taux d'occupation et d'autres conditions de location ;
• Comprendre le fonctionnement du logiciel. Identifier ses sources de données, ses méthodes de traitement et ses résultats afin de déterminer s'il remplit une fonction de coordination au sens de l'article 340-b ; et
• Former les équipes chargées de la location et de la gestion des trains à l'utilisation autorisée et non autorisée des outils de tarification tiers.

Entreprises fournissant des logiciels algorithmiques aux propriétaires immobiliers new-yorkais

Les fournisseurs de logiciels algorithmiques destinés aux personnes qui louent des biens immobiliers doivent :

• Vérifier les produits afin de confirmer qu'ils ne peuvent raisonnablement être classés comme remplissant une fonction de coordination au sens de l'article 340-b ;
• Examiner les résultats des audits et confirmer la conformité, en particulier dans les cas limites ;
• Consigner les conclusions en détail, y compris les sources de données, les versions des modèles et les résultats des audits de conformité afin de se prémunir contre toute responsabilité potentielle des facilitateurs ; et
• Mettre en place des fonctionnalités de conformité qui empêchent ou signalent les utilisations par les clients susceptibles d'enfreindre l'article 340-b et fournir des directives claires et du matériel de formation pour aider les clients à éviter les violations involontaires.

Entreprises new-yorkaises utilisant des prix algorithmiques pour les consommateurs

Les entreprises de l'État qui utilisent la tarification algorithmique doivent :

• Examiner les algorithmes de tarification afin de déterminer la couverture prévue à l'article 349-a ;
• Indiquer clairement aux consommateurs lorsque les prix publiés sont fixés par des algorithmes utilisant des données à caractère personnel ; et
• Suivre l'évolution du projet de loi S.B. 7033 de New York, qui pourrait interdire la discrimination algorithmique en matière de prix fondée sur les données relatives aux classes protégées.

Entreprises situées en dehors de New York

Les entreprises situées en dehors de l'État doivent :

• Suivre les évolutions législatives et les mesures d'application concernant la tarification algorithmique dans les juridictions concernées, car d'autres États, comme la Californie, ont adopté ou envisagent d'adopter des réglementations similaires.

Richard Lee et Savannah Miracle, associés chez Foley & Lardner, ainsi que Hannah Allbery, diplômée en droit, ont contribué à cet article, initialement publié dans Law360 le 17 décembre 2025, et est republié ici avec autorisation.


[1] Voir, par exemple,In re: RealPage Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litig. (No. II) , 709 F. Supp. 3d 478 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) ;In re: MultiPlan Health Ins. Provider Litig. , 789 F. Supp. 3d 614 (N.D. Ill. 2025).
[2] De nombreuses villes et localités ont promulgué leurs propres interdictions concernant la tarification algorithmique des loyers, notamment San Francisco, Berkeley, Santa Monica et San Diego (Californie) ; Jersey City et Hoboken (New Jersey) ; Seattle et King County (Washington) ; Philadelphie ; Minneapolis ; et Providence.
[3] N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340-b(3).
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Voir, par exemple,Gibson c. MGM Resorts Int’l , n° 2:23-CV-00140-MMD-DJA, 2023 WL 7025996, à *3 (D. Nev. 24 octobre 2023) (concluant que le fait de ne pas alléguer que les exploitants d'hôtels étaient tenus d'adopter les prix recommandés constituait une « lacune fatale dans la plainte »).
[7] N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340-b(1)(c).
[8] Voir, par exemple,Dai c. SAS Inst. Inc. , n° 24-CV-02537-JSW, 2025 WL 2078835, à *5 (N.D. Cal. 18 juillet 2025) (rejetant l'affaire au motif que « les faits [étaient] insuffisants pour permettre à la Cour de déduire raisonnablement un échange d'informations confidentielles ») ; Gibson c. Cendyn Grp. LLC , 148 F.4th 1069, 1083, n.8 (9e Cir. 2025) (confirmant le rejet lorsque les plaignants n'ont pas allégué que le fournisseur de logiciels « partageait des informations confidentielles sur chaque hôtel concurrent parmi les titulaires de licence »).
[9] N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340-b(3).
[10] Session du 6-10-25 : Audience sur AO1417, N.Y. State Assemb. 161-63 (2025).
[11] N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340-b(2).
[12] Voir id. § 340(1) ;Glob. Reinsurance Corp. U.S. Branch c. Equitas Ltd. , 969 N.E.2d 187, 196 (New York 2012).
[13] N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340-b(1)(d).
[14]In re: Gleason (Michael Vee Ltd.) , 749 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 2001).
[15] N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 341, 342-a.
[16] Id. §§ 340(5).
[17] Plainte à la page 1, RealPage Inc. c. James, n° 25-cv-9847 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
[18] Voir N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-a(2).
[19] VoirNat’l Retail Fed’n c. James , n° 25-CV-5500 (JSR), 2025 WL 2848212 (S.D.N.Y. 8 octobre 2025).