When Trade Becomes National Security: What the Administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy Signals for Companies and Cross Border Business

The Trump Administration’s release of the 2025 National Security Strategy (the “2025 NSS”) reinforces what has already become evident through policy and enforcement trends: trade, supply chains, and economic leverage are no longer supporting elements of national security policy, but rather its central tools. The most recent National Security Strategy was issued by the Biden administration in 2022.

By treating international trade as an enduring feature of national security strategy, the Trump Administration advances a redefinition of the commercial landscape. For multinational companies, this shift means that sourcing decisions, ownership structures, and supply chains now carry greater regulatory and enforcement risk than ever, including in markets and jurisdictions traditionally viewed as low risk.

Against this backdrop, companies should understand the specific tools the Trump Administration has identified in the 2025 NSS, the practical implications for cross border operations, and steps to manage risk while positioning for opportunity. The 2025 NSS should be regarded not merely from a birds-eye-view, but as a strategic roadmap designed to help companies avoid potential enforcement actions.

I. Strategic Use of Tariffs

II. Export & Dual-Use Trade Controls, Defense, and Trade Alignment with Allies

III. Anti-Competitive Barriers and Proxy Trade Enforcement

IV. Nearshoring and Hemispheric Trade Controls

V. Infrastructure and Investment Screening

VI. Energy Trade and Export Leverage

VII. Public-Private Trade and Compliance Partnerships

VIII. The 2025 National Security Strategy’s Impact in 2026

I. Strategic Use of Tariffs

The 2025 NSS makes clear that tariffs are no longer being viewed as episodic trade remedies or short-term negotiating tools, but as standing instruments of national security and industrial policy. The 2025 NSS expressly frames tariffs as tools of “commercial diplomacy,” gratuitously linking them to reindustrialization, supply chain independence, and the reshoring of critical production capacity, emphasizing that the United States must not remain dependent on adversaries or external actors for essential inputs and finished goods.

Who is most affected:

• U.S. importers and manufacturers sourcing inputs abroad;
• Foreign manufacturers exporting into the U.S. market; and
• Companies with contracts priced on low-tariff assumptions.

Corporate Implications and Recommendations
The 2025 NSS signals that tariff exposure is likely to persist and potentially expand, including outside traditional trade disputes. Companies should thus reassess their current contracts´ pricing strategies and sourcing decisions. Additionally, long-term supply and customer contracts should be structured with the understanding that tariffs are likely to remain a lasting element of the trade landscape, rather than a temporary measure. Companies should also evaluate their tariff exposure across the current and planned supply chains and create “fallback” sourcing scenarios which should be reflected in their current upstream and downstream contracts.

Foley regularly advises companies on tariff exposure, country of origin planning, and trade remedy risk, helping clients structure sourcing, pricing, and contracts to manage sustained tariff and enforcement pressure. For more information on Tariffs and Foley’s Tariff Related Client Resources, visit our Tariff and International Trade Resources Page at: https://www.foley.com/insights/category/blogs/tariff-international-trade-resources.

II. Export & Dual-Use Trade Controls, Defense, and Trade Alignment with Allies

The 2025 NSS emphasizes that export controls will increasingly be deployed in coordination with allies. Favorable commercial treatment, technology sharing, and broader economic cooperation are now increasingly linked to alignment with U.S. export control regimes and an expectation that partner countries will assume greater responsibility for security in their own regions.

In this way, export controls function not only as restrictions, but also as leverage to shape allied behavior and reinforce regional security. Meanwhile trade and industrial policy are explicitly linked to military readiness and deterrence, extending scrutiny beyond traditional defense articles to defense-adjacent commercial sectors.

Who is most affected:

• Multinational companies operating in technology and manufacturing, and industrial firms with dual use products or components and technology that is exported abroad;
• Multinational companies operating in areas of concern for the U.S. from a security perspective such as Latin America, Asia, or the Middle East;
• Manufacturers supplying dual use components or software, particularly in the quantum computing, semiconductor, and other advanced technologies industries; and
• Companies adjacent to aerospace, automotive, energy, or advanced manufacturing.

Corporate Implications and Recommendations
Export control compliance will increasingly affect market access and commercial relationships, not just for traditionally controlled technologies. Companies should review export classifications across product lines, align global compliance programs with U.S. standards, and assess whether partners or joint ventures create exposure that could restrict growth or market access. Companies should also identify defense-adjacent exposure, review sourcing pathways, and evaluate whether new procurement or international collaboration opportunities justify enhanced compliance investment.

Foley’s cross border trade and national security teams can help companies design and align global export control compliance programs to preserve market access and reduce regulatory friction across jurisdictions. For more information on export controls, read Foley’s recent publication “What Every Multinational Should Know About . . . U.S. Export Controls & Economic Sanctions” at: https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2025/12/what-every-multinational-should-know-about-u-s-export-controls-economic-sanctions/.

III. Anti-Competitive Barriers and Proxy Trade Enforcement

The 2025 Strategy signals an enforcement posture that looks beyond formal country-of-origin labels to the underlying substance of supply chains, including ownership, upstream inputs, financing arrangements, and production processes. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for more aggressive customs enforcement and anti-circumvention measures. Nearshoring alone will therefore not insulate operations from enforcement risk.

Who is most affected:
• Companies manufacturing in Mexico or Southeast Asia for the U.S. market;
• Businesses with China-linked inputs or upstream production; and
• Importers relying on third country assembly.

Corporate Implications and Recommendations

The 2025 NSS lays the groundwork for more aggressive enforcement relating to customs fraud and anti-circumvention measures. Companies should conduct origin and supply chain audits, review USMCA qualification, and prepare for increased customs audits by maintaining updated and compliant documentation.

Foley assists companies in assessing origin, supply chain structure, and anti-circumvention risk, including preparing for customs audits and enforcement actions. For more information on export controls, view Foley’s recent publication “What Every Multinational Company Should Know About … the Use of Reshoring to Navigate Tariff Uncertainty” at: https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2025/08/what-every-multinational-should-know-about-the-use-of-reshoring-to-navigate-tariff-uncertainty/.

IV. Nearshoring and Hemispheric Trade Controls

The 2025 NSS identifies nearshoring manufacturing as a strategic objective tied to supply chain security and broader regional stability concerns. At the same time, the 2025 NSS notes that trade and investment relationships will be conditioned on limiting non-hemispheric influence and ownership, particularly with respect to strategically vital assets, infrastructure, and supply chains.

Who is most affected:
• U.S. companies investing or contracting in Mexico or Latin America should be more vigilant as to ownership-interests in their supply chain;
• Foreign companies considering nearshoring for U.S. market access; and
• Businesses using private equity or foreign backed capital.

Corporate Implications and Recommendations
Companies should assess nearshoring strategies through an ownership and control lens, review extended supplier and investor relationships, and incorporate national security diligence into site selection and financing decisions. U.S. company contracting and investing in foreign nations now carries a much higher level of risk for U.S. companies that must undergo additional diligence and outward investment screening.

Foley advises U.S. and foreign companies on nearshoring strategies, Department of Treasury prohibitions and notification requirements, and cross border investment structures to ensure operations withstand national security scrutiny.

V. Infrastructure and Investment Screening

The 2025 NSS makes clear that the United States intends to deny non-hemispheric competitors’ ownership or control of strategically vital assets. Trade, aid, and financing relationships are conditioned on winding down adversarial foreign influence across infrastructure and strategic sectors, including ports, communications, energy, and logistics. These commitments suggest a more expansive view of what constitutes a strategic asset and a greater willingness to scrutinize ownership, governance, and financing arrangements tied to infrastructure projects.

The 2025 NSS relatedly identifies U.S. dominance in financial and capital markets as a key lever of national power. Access to U.S. capital is framed as a mechanism to influence trade, investment, and alignment decisions.

Who is most affected:

• Infrastructure developers and logistics companies;
• Companies engaged in cross border M&A;
• Foreign investors acquiring U.S. or hemispheric assets (military installations, ports, key infrastructure, etc.); and
• U.S. companies with foreign investors and foreign companies accessing U.S. capital markets.

Corporate Implications and Recommendations

Companies should anticipate increased CFIUS filings, longer review timelines, and broader transaction coverage. Companies should also review capital structures for geopolitical sensitivity and coordinate legal and finance teams on cross border investment planning. National security review should be incorporated early into deal planning and structuring.

Foley’s CFIUS and national security team guides clients through transaction screening and mitigation planning. For more information from Foley about CFIUS, visit Foley’s multi-article series on CFIUS considerations: https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2024/08/multinational-company-international-mergers-acquisitions-1/ (Part 1), https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2024/08/what-every-multinational-company-should-know-about-international-mergers-acquisitions-cfius/ (Part 2),

VI. Energy Trade and Export Leverage

The 2025 NSS identifies energy dominance across oil, gas, coal, and nuclear as a top strategic priority. Expanding U.S. energy exports is framed as a means to deepen alliances and curtail adversary influence, while reshoring energy related supply chains is treated as a security objective.

The Strategy expressly rejects climate-driven policy frameworks, citing their potential to undermine industrial competitiveness and energy security.

Who is most affected:
• Energy producers and exporters;
• Energy-intensive manufacturers; and
• Infrastructure and equipment suppliers.

Corporate Implications and Recommendations

Companies should assess export opportunities alongside geopolitical risk and review energy supply chains for sourcing vulnerabilities.

Foley advises energy producers and industrial clients on trade and investment issues arising from shifting energy policy. For more information related to the developing situation in Venezuela as it relates to the energy sector, view Foley’s recent alert “Legal Risks Associated With Accelerated Investment Opportunities in Venezuela” at:  https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2026/01/legal-risks-associated-with-accelerated-investment-opportunities-in-venezuela/

VII. Public-Private Trade and Compliance Partnerships

The 2025 NSS calls for closer coordination between government and the private sector to protect supply chains, infrastructure, and technological leadership. In doing so, it reinforces that trade compliance, cybersecurity, and supply-chain transparency are no longer discrete risk areas, but increasingly interconnected components of national security policy.

Who is most affected:

• Companies operating in regulated, infrastructure, or technology-intensive sectors;
• Businesses with significant cross-border data flows, logistics, or communications exposure; and
• Companies that rely on complex, multi-tier global supply chains or third-party vendors.
  
  

Corporate Implications and Recommendations

Companies should prepare for increased government engagement and integrate compliance, cybersecurity, and supply chain governance into unified risk frameworks.

Foley assists companies in structuring and implementing these integrated compliance frameworks, advising on government engagement, and managing trade, cybersecurity, and supply-chain risk in a coordinated manner.

VIII. The 2025 National Security Strategy’s Impact in 2026

While still early in 2026, the 2025 NSS is already influencing tariff policy, supply-chain security initiatives, and allied coordination in ways that carry material implications for cross-border businesses. Examples include:

• The Use of Tariffs to Support National Security Strategy: In early 2026, the U.S. and India reached a trade deal under which the U.S. agreed to cut India’s tariffs to 18% in exchange for India agreeing to halt Russian oil purchases and boost U.S. energy imports. This development demonstrates how tariff policy is being used as leverage to shape geopolitical and commercial outcomes in line with the Strategy’s priorities.[1]

• Critical Mineral and Supply Chain Initiative to Reduce Reliance on Foreign Countries: In February 2026, the Administration launched “Project Vault,” a $12 billion initiative to build a strategic stockpile of rare earth and critical minerals to reduce reliance on China and enhance domestic and ally-countries supply-chain resilience for advanced technologies, a concrete move in line with the Strategy’s focus on economic leverage and supply-chain security. The U.S. Export-Import Bank will provide $10 billion in the form of a loan, with about $2 billion coming from private capital which also demonstrates the Strategy’s goal of increases government and private sector coordination.[2]

Foley’s multidisciplinary international trade and national security team advises U.S. and multinational companies on tariffs, export controls, customs and anti-circumvention enforcement, nearshoring and cross-border investment structuring, CFIUS and other national security reviews, and supply-chain risk management. To discuss how Foley & Lardner can assist with navigating the trade, investment, and compliance implications of the 2025 National Security Strategy, please contact Alejandro Gomez ([email protected]), Olivia Singelmann ([email protected]), Jack Korba ([email protected]), or Ahmad Murrar ([email protected]).

[1] See “Trump says he will cut tariffs on India after it agreed to stop buying Russian oil”, The Associated Press (Feb, 2, 2026), https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/trump-says-will-cut-tariffs-india-agreed-stop-buying-russian-oil-rcna257186.

[2] “Introducing Project Vault, a critical mineral stockpile for American businesses”, The White House (Feb. 2, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/introducing-project-vault-a-critical-mineral-stockpile-for-american-businesses-%F0%9F%92%8E%F0%9F%87%BA%F0%9F%87%B8/; see also  Pippa Stevens, “Trump Project Vault stockpile will include any minerals listed as ‘critical’ by Interior Department”, Cnbc (Feb. 3, 2026), https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/03/trump-stockpile-critical-minerals-reserve-project-vault.html.