DOJ Announces First-Ever Antitrust Whistleblower Award — Is Your Compliance Program Ready?
On January 29, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division announced its first reward under the Division’s new whistleblower program, awarding $1 million to a whistleblower whose report helped uncover a bid‑rigging and fraud scheme involving EBLOCK Corporation, an online platform for buying and selling wholesale vehicles. The award represents nearly 30 percent of the $3.28 million criminal fine EBLOCK agreed to pay as part of a deferred prosecution agreement.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Omeed A. Assefi underscored the importance of this new program, stating: “Whistleblowers serve as the Justice System’s greatest disinfectant against criminal antitrust conspiracies.”
Launched in July 2025, the antitrust whistleblower program allows qualifying whistleblowers to receive a portion of criminal fines collected if their information materially contributes to a successful prosecution. As discussed in our prior article, the key eligibility criteria include:
- The conduct must be an “eligible criminal violation”, such as cartel activity prohibited by Sections 1, 2, or 3 of the Sherman Act, or related offenses like wire fraud, bribery, obstruction, or false statements.
- The case must result in a fine of at least $1 million.
- The whistleblower’s information must materially assist the investigation.
The program is funded through a statute permitting the U.S. Postal Service to distribute a portion of collected fines. The Postal Service need only have a limited nexus to the conduct, which can be established in various ways (as in this case, where mail was used to transmit scheme‑related documents).
This first antitrust whistleblower award illustrates the type of incentive DOJ wanted to create for knowledgeable parties to report antitrust violations — and serves as a reminder for companies to discover, remediate, and report problematic conduct quickly before a potential whistleblower acts.
The EBLOCK Case: Deferred Prosecution Shows Value of Prompt Self‑Reporting
According to DOJ’s announcement, EBLOCK acquired an unnamed “Company A” but failed to terminate an ongoing bid‑rigging and fraud conspiracy at that business, allowing the conspiracy to continue for roughly 18 months. The scheme allegedly suppressed competition for used vehicles sold through the acquired company’s online platform, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as well as federal wire fraud laws.
EBLOCK avoided criminal indictment by entering into a deferred prosecution agreement. In general, DOJ policy provides a presumption in favor of declining prosecution when a company voluntarily self‑discloses, fully cooperates, and timely remediates misconduct discovered through due diligence conducted shortly before or after a bona fide, lawful acquisition. In the acquisition context, this generally means disclosure must occur within 180 days of the closing date.
In 2024, the DOJ Criminal Division launched the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program for a three-year term. This program amended the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy through at least August 1, 2027. The amendment allows a company to qualify for declination even if a whistleblower has already reported the misconduct to the government, so long as the company self‑discloses within 120 days of receiving the internal whistleblower report and satisfies all other voluntary self‑disclosure criteria. While the Criminal Division policy does not bind the Antitrust Division, the Antitrust Division has increasingly sought to harmonize its approach with broader DOJ policies.
The Antitrust Division’s new whistleblower program adds urgency to the timeline for corporate decision making surrounding internal investigations because, once 120 days have passed from an internal report, the number of potential whistleblowers eligible for an award expands. As a result, it is not enough to promptly identify possible misconduct. Companies must move quickly to conduct a credible internal investigation, assess the facts and potential legal exposure, and decide whether to disclose to the Division — all within the 120‑day window — to preserve the opportunity for cooperation credit or declination.
Why This Matters Now
The outcome in this case underscores the heightened importance of immediate action when potential antitrust violations surface. Although the first company to self-report may secure leniency, as DOJ cautioned, “the race is faster now, because employees and their attorneys are incentivized to blow the whistle and beat their companies to the Division’s doorstep.”
DOJ has signaled that more whistleblower awards are on the horizon. Moreover, as a practical matter, now that whistleblowers and their counsel have seen that significant awards can be granted quickly, more individuals may choose to come forward in the near future. The new whistleblower program compresses the window in which a company can discover, investigate, and make a decision on self‑reporting. To adopt the DOJ’s metaphor, the starter pistol has fired and the race has begun so businesses should assess whether their compliance programs and reporting mechanisms enable them to identify potential antitrust risks quickly and escalate them to decisionmakers in time to preserve cooperation credit options.