What Every Multinational Should Know About …Managing the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Historic IEEPA Tariff Case (Part VII)

The Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the IEEPA tariffs was historic. But it did not mark the end of aggressive U.S. tariff policy, just the end of one tariff platform. What has become clear in the days since is that the administration is already moving to rebuild high tariffs through other, more conventional trade statutes.

That shift matters enormously for multinational companies. As discussed throughout this eight-part series, the Supreme Court’s ruling has created a complicated post-decision environment involving refund litigation, contractual disputes, customs issues, and supply chain adjustments. At the same time, companies must now plan for the next generation of tariffs, which are likely to be more structured, more targeted, and probably more durable than the IEEPA measures they replace.

To help companies navigate this landscape,, the Foley International Trade & National Security and Supply Chain teams are providing this eight-article series regarding how to manage the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision. The series covers:

• Part I: Understanding the New Section 122 Tariffs and Preserving IEEPA Refund Rights (found here)
• Part II: Preserving the Right to IEEPA Tariff Refunds (found here)
• Part III: Contractual Issues for Companies That Are Importers of Record (found here)
• Part IV: Customs & Supply Chain Issues for Importers of Record (found here)
• Part V: Refund-Related Issues for Companies That Indirectly Paid IEEPA Tariffs (found here)
• Part VI: Avoiding Common Pitfalls When Dealing with Refund-Related Issues (found here)

• Part VII: Understanding the Future Landing Spot for Tariffs
• Part VIII: What Steps Should Importers Owed Refunds Be Taking to Prepare

Part VII follows.

Understanding the Future Landing Spot for Tariffs

High Tariffs Are Not Going Away – They Are Being Reinstated Under New Statutory Authorities

The Supreme Court’s ruling rejected IEEPA as a basis for broad tariffs, but it did not call into question tariffs imposed under other trade statutes. That means the decision removed one legal mechanism, not the broader policy goals that drove the tariffs in the first place. The question, therefore, is no longer whether tariff pressure will continue after IEEPA.

Instead, the question is which statutory tools will carry that pressure going forward. The post-IEEPA landscape appears to be organized around three principal authorities: Section 122 as a short-term bridge; Section 232 as the main sector-based national security tool; and Section 301 as the principal country- and policy-based unfair-trade tool.

Section 122: The Bridge, Not the Destination

The administration’s immediate response to the Supreme Court’s decision was the temporary tariff imposed under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. The White House announced on February 20, 2026, that the President had imposed a 10% ad valorem import duty, effective February 24, 2026, for up to 150 days. The proclamation states that the surcharge is to remain operative until July 24, 2026, unless earlier modified or otherwise lawfully changed. Section 122 itself is a balance-of-payments provision that authorizes the President to impose a temporary import surcharge of up to 15% ad valorem for a period not exceeding 150 days, unless Congress acts to extend it.

That statutory time limit is critical. Section 122 is plainly functioning as a bridge tariff, not a stable long-term platform for tariff policy. It preserves tariff pressure in the short term while the administration develops more durable replacement measures under other authorities. In effect, it gives the administration a way to prevent a sudden collapse in tariff leverage after the Supreme Court’s ruling, while buying time to shift toward statutes that rest on more developed investigative processes and, in many cases, firmer legal footing. The March 11 Section 301 actions strongly suggest that this handoff is already in progress.

Section 122 is also important because of what it does not provide. Unlike Section 232 or Section 301, it is not built around a sector-specific national-security investigation, or a country-specific unfair-trade record. It is a blunt, temporary authority designed to address “fundamental international payments problems,” not a durable framework for a multi-year industrial or geopolitical tariff strategy. That makes it useful as an interim measure, but a poor candidate for serving as the administration’s principal tariff architecture over the longer term.

The Section 122 action also illustrates an important structural feature of the emerging tariff system: layering. The White House has stated that certain goods already subject to Section 232 are excluded from the Section 122 surcharge. That carveout is significant. It indicates that the administration is not looking for a single, one-for-one substitute for IEEPA, but rather a more fragmented framework in which multiple tariff programs may coexist and interact. Some products may remain under Section 232; others may become subject to new Section 301 remedies; and Section 122 operates in the meantime as a temporary baseline measure.

In that respect, Section 122 is best understood as a transitional mechanism. It keeps tariff pressure in place, preserves negotiating leverage, and prevents an immediate policy vacuum. But it also points beyond itself. Its short duration, its broad structure, and the administration’s simultaneous move toward new Section 301 investigations all underscore the same point: Section 122 is not where the tariff story ends. It is where the next chapter begins.

Section 232: Plan B Becomes the Central Tariff Authority

Section 232 authorizes the President to impose tariffs, quotas, or other trade restrictions when imports are determined to threaten U.S. national security. The process begins with an investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce, which evaluates the impact of imports on domestic industries that may be critical to national defense or economic security. If Commerce determines that imports threaten national security, the President has broad authority to implement remedial measures.

In recent years, Section 232 has evolved into one of the most powerful and flexible tariff authorities available to the executive branch. During the first Trump administration, the statute served as the legal basis for tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, which reshaped global supply chains and triggered retaliatory measures from U.S. trading partners. The international trade courts ultimately upheld those tariffs, reinforcing the significant deference historically afforded to the executive branch in matters involving national security determinations.

That legal durability makes Section 232 particularly attractive in the post-IEEPA environment. Unlike emergency powers statutes such as IEEPA, Section 232 tariffs are supported by a formal administrative investigation, an evidentiary record, and explicit statutory findings regarding national security risks. Those procedural elements make the resulting tariffs more difficult to challenge in court.

The expanded use of Section 232 continues a trend already started. In January of 2026, the White House announced Section 232 actions related to semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and processed critical minerals and derivative products. These actions build on earlier Section 232 measures involving steel, aluminum, automobiles, copper, and timber and lumber. Taken together, they signal a broader strategic shift in how the United States defines national security in the trade context.

Historically, Section 232 investigations focused primarily on traditional defense industries. Today, the concept of national security has expanded significantly. Recent investigations and policy statements indicate that national security now encompasses a wide range of economic and industrial considerations, including:

• the resilience of critical supply chains;
• the ability to manufacture advanced technologies domestically;
• access to essential raw materials and inputs;
• dependence on foreign manufacturing capacity for strategically important goods; and
• the long-term viability of key domestic industries.

This expanded interpretation dramatically increases the range of sectors that could potentially fall within the scope of Section 232 investigations.

For multinational companies, that shift has important practical consequences. Section 232 tariffs tend to be sector-specific, meaning entire industries or supply chains can suddenly become subject to elevated duties. Moreover, once imposed, Section 232 tariffs are likely to remain in place for extended periods because they are tied to structural national-security findings rather than temporary economic conditions.

In short, Section 232 is no longer simply a metals tariff tool. It is increasingly functioning as the administration’s primary mechanism for imposing tariffs tied to industrial strategy, technology leadership, and supply chain resilience.

Section 301: The Rise of the Plan C Broad-Based Unfair Trade Tool

Alongside Section 232, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is emerging as the second central pillar of U.S. tariff policy.

Section 301 authorizes the United States to impose trade remedies, including tariffs, in response to foreign government practices that are deemed unreasonable, discriminatory, or otherwise burdensome to U.S. commerce. Investigations are conducted by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and typically involve extensive public comment, evidentiary submissions, and consultations with affected stakeholders.

Section 301 gained global prominence during the first Trump administration, when it served as the statutory basis for the sweeping tariffs imposed on Chinese imports beginning in 2018. Those tariffs targeted hundreds of billions of dollars in goods and became one of the defining features of U.S.–China trade policy. Importantly, courts ultimately upheld the legality of those measures, reinforcing Section 301’s status as a robust and durable tool for imposing tariffs in response to perceived unfair trade practices.

On March 11, 2026, USTR formally initiated new Section 301 investigations into structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors across 16 economies. The investigations target China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India.

The scope of these investigations is notable. Rather than focusing on a single country or specific industry practice, the investigations examine whether certain economies exhibit structural characteristics, such as persistent trade surpluses or significant unused industrial capacity, which may distort global markets and harm U.S. manufacturing.

USTR has opened a formal comment process for these investigations, with comment dockets opening March 17, 2026, written comments and hearing requests due April 15, 2026, and hearings beginning May 5, 2026.

The launch of these investigations signals a broader evolution in how Section 301 may be used going forward. Rather than focusing narrowly on specific trade disputes, the statute may increasingly serve as a tool for addressing systemic economic concerns such as industrial overcapacity, state subsidies, or government-directed production policies.

For multinational companies, this development has several important implications.

• First, Section 301 risk is no longer limited to the legacy China tariffs. The new investigations involve a wide range of economies, including major trading partners and key manufacturing hubs.
• Second, Section 301 tariffs are inherently flexible. They can be applied to specific products, sectors, or countries and can be adjusted over time depending on the outcome of negotiations or changes in foreign government policies.
• Third, the statute provides policymakers with a powerful geopolitical instrument. By imposing targeted tariffs, the United States can exert economic pressure on trading partners in an effort to influence foreign industrial policies, trade practices, or regulatory frameworks.

Businesses with exposure to the economies now under investigation, or to sectors characterized by global overcapacity, should monitor these developments closely. Once a Section 301 investigation gains momentum, the path toward potential tariffs can move quickly, and affected industries may have only limited opportunities to influence the outcome through the comment process.

Other Trade Tools Still Matter

Although Sections 122, 232, and 301 appear to be the central pillars of the emerging post-IEEPA tariff architecture, they are far from the only trade authorities available to policymakers. USTR’s 2026 Trade Policy Agenda signals continued interest in using a broad range of statutory tools to address structural trade issues, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and foreign economic practices that the United States believes distort global markets. In practice, that means the administration retains a wide menu of trade instruments that can be deployed depending on the industry, country, or policy objective involved.

One such authority is Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which provides for so-called “safeguard” measures. Section 201 allows the United States to impose temporary tariffs or quotas when a surge in imports causes or threatens serious injury to a domestic industry. Although safeguard actions are relatively rare, they have occasionally produced sweeping trade restrictions, such as the tariffs imposed on solar panels and washing machines in recent years.

Another authority that remains on the books is Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which allows the United States to impose retaliatory duties of up to 50 percent on imports from countries that impose discriminatory restrictions on U.S. commerce. Section 338 has been used infrequently in modern trade policy, largely because other statutes, particularly Section 301, provide more structured procedures for addressing unfair trade practices. Nevertheless, the statute could theoretically be invoked in situations where policymakers seek to respond quickly to discriminatory foreign trade measures.

Beyond these authorities, the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws continue to play a central role in the U.S. trade-enforcement landscape. These laws allow the United States to impose duties on imports that are sold at less than fair value or that benefit from government subsidies. AD/CVD cases typically are initiated through petitions filed by domestic industries and involve detailed investigations by the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission. Although these measures are narrower and more product-specific than broader tariff programs, they can result in extremely high duty rates and remain in place for many years.

Taken together, these authorities illustrate an important reality: the U.S. trade statute landscape provides policymakers with a wide array of options beyond emergency powers like IEEPA. While none of these tools individually replicates the sweeping flexibility that IEEPA tariffs once provided, they collectively allow the United States to maintain significant trade pressure across multiple sectors and trading partners.

New Tariffs Are Likely to Be Paired with Stronger Enforcement

Companies should not assume that the end of the IEEPA tariffs will produce a softer customs-enforcement environment. As tariffs increase, the financial incentives for companies to reduce duty exposure also increase. Businesses may seek to minimize tariff costs through aggressive interpretations of classification rules, valuation methodologies, country-of-origin determinations, product design modifications, or supply-chain routing strategies.

Enforcement agencies are well aware of these incentives. Over the past several years, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has significantly expanded its use of trade data analytics, automated monitoring tools, and targeted enforcement initiatives to identify anomalies in import transactions. These systems allow CBP to compare import data across companies, ports of entry, and supply chains to identify patterns that may indicate tariff evasion or misreporting.

As a result, companies should expect heightened scrutiny across several key areas of customs compliance, including:

• country-of-origin determinations, particularly where supply chains involve jurisdictions subject to higher tariffs;
• tariff classification decisions, especially where reclassification could significantly reduce duty liability;
• valuation methodologies, including transfer pricing arrangements and the treatment of assists or other statutory additions;
• tariff engineering strategies, where products are modified to fall outside the scope of particular duties; and
• potential transshipment risks, including routing goods through third countries to avoid tariffs applicable to their true country of origin.

In addition to increased use of Customs inquiries, such as those pursuant to Form 28 Requests for Information, enforcement activity will involve more aggressive use of tools such as EAPA investigations and aggressive responses to eAllegations. For businesses operating in global supply chains, the combination of higher tariffs, stronger enforcement, and greater chances of discovery means that customs compliance, supply-chain transparency, and tariff-risk management will become even more critical components of corporate trade strategy as we continue to reside in a high-tariff, high-penalty, high-enforcement importing environment.

What Companies Should Be Doing Now

The invalidation of the IEEPA tariffs does not eliminate the policy forces driving U.S. trade actions. Businesses should use this transition period to reassess their tariff exposure, compliance posture, and supply chain strategies before the next wave of tariffs takes shape.

First, in a more fragmented tariff system, where multiple statutes may impose overlapping or sector-specific duties, companies should consider developing a consolidated tariff exposure map that identifies:

• key imported products and their associated duty rates;
• sourcing locations and supplier dependencies;
• exposure to specific tariff regimes such as Sections 232, 301, and AD/CVD measures;
• the relative importance of different imports to revenue or production; and
• potential tariff exposure tied to strategic supply chains.

Second, companies also should closely monitor developments under Section 232 and Section 301, which appear to be the two most significant tariff authorities likely to shape the next phase of U.S. trade policy. Companies should consider participating in the comments submission process particularly where companies wish to:

• highlight supply-chain dependencies that could be disrupted by tariffs;
• provide data on downstream economic impacts;
• advocate for exclusions or targeted product coverage; or
• influence the scope and design of potential trade measures.

Third, companies should reassess whether products not currently covered by Section 232 could realistically be swept into future sector-based actions. Historically, Section 232 actions focused primarily on traditional defense-related industries. Today, however, the concept of “national security” is being applied far more broadly to encompass supply-chain resilience, technological leadership, energy security, and access to critical industrial inputs.

Recent actions and policy signals from the Administration indicate that the potential universe of Section 232 investigations now extends well beyond steel, aluminum, and autos. Sectors that have already been the subject of announced or contemplated Section 232 reviews include semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, processed critical minerals, copper, timber and lumber, pharmaceuticals, commercial aircraft and aerospace components, wind turbines and other energy systems, robotics, unmanned aircraft systems (drones), personal protective equipment, and medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and related parts.

For many companies, the most significant exposure may not arise from direct coverage of their finished products. Instead, risk may arise through upstream inputs or components that fall within the scope of a future investigation. Products incorporating semiconductors, chip-manufacturing equipment, copper inputs, critical minerals, or other strategic materials could face indirect tariff exposure even if the final product category is not itself the focus of the investigation.

Companies operating in advanced manufacturing, energy systems, transportation equipment, industrial machinery, life sciences, and technology sectors should therefore evaluate whether their products, or key inputs within their supply chains, could plausibly fall within the scope of future national-security investigations. In the current policy environment, Section 232 exposure is expanding in ways that many companies may still be underestimating, and businesses that begin assessing potential exposure now will be better positioned to respond if new investigations are launched.

Fourth, companies should stress-test country-of-origin determinations and revisit whether tariff volatility is adequately addressed in pricing models, sourcing arrangements, and contractual frameworks. The IEEPA tariff cycle exposed how frequently commercial agreements fail to anticipate rapid tariff shifts. Many companies discovered that their contracts addressed tariff increases only in vague or incomplete ways, or failed to address them at all. Even fewer contracts contemplated the possibility of tariff reversals, refunds, or complex duty allocation issues between suppliers and customers.

Companies should therefore review whether their commercial structures adequately address issues such as:

• allocation of tariff risk between suppliers and purchasers;
• mechanisms for adjusting pricing when tariffs change;
• procedures for handling tariff refunds or reversals;
• notice requirements tied to tariff-related price adjustments; and
• supply-chain flexibility in response to new trade restrictions.

At the same time, companies should revisit their country-of-origin analyses. In a high-tariff environment, origin determinations often become the most consequential element of customs compliance. Small differences in manufacturing processes, component sourcing, or production sequencing can dramatically change duty outcomes. Ensuring that origin determinations are accurate, well documented, and consistent with customs rules can significantly reduce both tariff exposure and enforcement risk.

Fifth, companies should evaluate tariff-mitigation strategies before new tariff measures are imposed. Once tariffs are in place, supply-chain adjustments often become more costly and difficult to implement. Potential mitigation strategies may include:

• diversifying sourcing across multiple countries or suppliers;
• shifting production steps in ways that alter country-of-origin outcomes;
• redesigning products to achieve more favorable tariff classifications;
• evaluating tariff engineering opportunities within the bounds of customs law;
• utilizing foreign-trade zones (FTZs) or bonded warehouses to defer duties; and
• leveraging duty drawback programs where imports are later exported.

While these approaches may require operational changes, they can significantly reduce tariff exposure in a policy environment characterized by frequent and unpredictable tariff actions.

Finally, companies should strengthen customs compliance programs in anticipation of heightened enforcement. In the new high-tariff, high-enforcement, high-penalty environment, companies should ensure their customs compliance programs include:

• a tailored compliance manual;
• accurate and well-supported tariff classification processes;
• a Customs Classification Index to ensure consistent and accurate classification of entries;
• documented origin analyses for key products, especially if the company has implemented a China +1 strategy of using Chinese parts and components further manufactured in third countries;
• appropriate treatment of assists and transfer-pricing arrangements in customs valuation;
• strong post-entry checks designed to identify and correct potential errors; and
• robust recordkeeping practices.

In a high-tariff environment, mistakes in classification, origin, valuation, claims of free trade preferences, and other errors are more likely to attract scrutiny from regulators. Strengthening compliance infrastructure now can help companies avoid enforcement problems later.

*           *           *

The administration’s recent actions make the direction of future tariff policy clear. The temporary Section 122 bridge tariff, the expanding Section 232 framework, and the new Section 301 investigations all point toward a post-IEEPA regime that is likely to be more structured, more sector-specific, more policy-driven, and likely more durable than the regime it replaces. Companies that map exposure now, monitor developments closely, participate where appropriate in administrative processes, and align sourcing, pricing, and implement enhanced compliance strategies will be best positioned for the next phase of U.S. trade policy.

If you have questions about these developments, including how the new Section 301 investigations or the expanding Section 232 landscape may affect your business, please reach out to the authors or your Foley & Lardner relationship attorney. If you have questions about these developments — including strategies for preserving IEEPA refund rights, complying with the new Section 122 tariffs, or adapting supply chains to the evolving tariff landscape — the Foley International Trade & National Security is available to assist.

The Foley International Trade & National Security Practice

The Foley International Trade & National Security Team covers the full gamut of international trade needs, including for tariffs, Customs, supply chain/supply chain integrity, trade remedies/antidumping/countervailing duty, export controls, economic sanctions, and CFIUS national security filings. Our Tariff & International Trade blog regularly publishes practical guidance, like this client alert, on all international trade topics and compiles it by topic area on the Foley Tariff & International Trade Resources blog. Click Here to Register for our email list to receive future emails and practical international regulatory compliance tips, including our biweekly What Every Multinational Should Know articles.