What Every Multinational Should Know About … Rising Enforcement Risks Linked to Criminal Organizations and Cartels in Latin America
Key Takeaways
- Enforcement risk increasingly extends beyond direct cartel dealings to third parties and supply chains.
- Sanctions screening alone may not identify indirect ownership, control, or financial exposure.
- Companies should reassess risks across logistics, customs, payments, security, and labor channels.
- Enhanced diligence, payment controls, and clear escalation procedures can help mitigate exposure.
Recent developments in the United States and across Latin America point to a steadily intensifying enforcement environment targeting criminal organizations and cartels active in the region. For multinational companies, the resulting risk extends beyond direct dealings with designated traffickers or other illicit actors to broader exposure through the commercial, logistical, and financial networks on which those organizations rely.
Compliance frameworks need to evolve accordingly. Multinationals with operations, supply chains, distribution channels, service providers, or payment flows touching higher-risk markets in Latin America should revisit their risk assessments to determine whether existing sanctions, anti-money laundering, and third‑party controls are sufficiently tailored to this more assertive and coordinated enforcement landscape.
Why This Matters Now
Two recent pronouncements are particularly instructive.
- On September 15, 2026, President Trump submitted to Congress the Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2027 (the Determination). Among other things, the Determination identified several Latin American jurisdictions as major drug transit or illicit drug-producing countries and stated that the Government of Brazil had failed to confront Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho, both of which the U.S. State Department designated earlier this year as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
- On September 22, 2026, the 15 countries participating in the Shield of the Americas initiative issued a joint statement announcing their intention to pursue individual and collective measures against 24 designated criminal organizations operating across the Americas. The participating governments indicated that they intend to employ tools including asset freezes, immigration and visa restrictions, and criminal liability for persons who knowingly provide material or logistical support to targeted organizations.
These developments signal a more coordinated and expansive enforcement posture against criminal organizations and those who support them. Notably, the Shield of the Americas joint statement would not have occurred without a push from the U.S. government, which is looking to go beyond the tools available solely to U.S. regulators. For businesses operating in the region, the risk environment is becoming more complex.
Key Enforcement Risks for Multinationals
As additional criminal organizations and related actors are designated, multinational companies face heightened risk not only in connection with dealings involving listed persons but also with respect to transactions involving entities owned or controlled by them. In higher‑risk jurisdictions, opaque ownership structures, nominee arrangements, and extensive subcontracting can make such exposure difficult to identify absent enhanced diligence. Because the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) applies a 50% rule in which an entity owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, by one or more blocked persons also is treated as a blocked entity, screening against published sanctions lists, while necessary, may be insufficient where a counterparty’s ownership chain has not been adequately assessed or where beneficial ownership information is incomplete or unreliable.
Beyond opaque ownership and nominee structures, several additional risks complicate exposure to criminal organizations and cartels:
- Indirect control and influence, not just formal ownership. Criminal organizations may exert control through family members, trusted lieutenants, or “silent partners” who hold minority stakes but effectively direct operations. This can fall outside simple ownership‑percentage tests yet still implicate sanctions, material‑support, or Anti-Money Laundering (AML) risk.
- Layered subcontracting and informal local arrangements. Even where the immediate counterparty is clean, subcontractors, local fixers, or informal partners they use may be tied to criminal groups or pay them for access to routes, permits, or protection. That risk often sits several tiers down the chain and is hard to see from headquarters.
- Coercion and protection payments. In some localities, otherwise legitimate businesses are pressured to make extortion or “tax” payments to criminal organizations to operate. A multinational may be exposed if its distributor, agent, or contractor is funding a designated group under duress, particularly where those payments are embedded in pricing or margins.
- Use of legitimate channels to move or disguise value. Criminal organizations may use ordinary trade, logistics, and services (e.g., freight, warehousing, security, construction, or cash‑intensive services) to launder funds or move goods. A company can inadvertently facilitate this if it provides the infrastructure or services without recognizing red flags.
- Misuse of digital and alternative payment channels. Increasing reliance on fintech, digital assets, payment aggregators, and informal value transfer systems creates opportunities for criminal groups to move funds with limited transparency. A multinational that uses or integrates such channels may unintentionally enable or obscure illicit flows.
- Regulatory arbitrage and jurisdictional gaps. Criminal organizations may deliberately route transactions through jurisdictions with weaker enforcement or fragmented regulatory frameworks. Multinationals relying on regional hubs or complex cross‑border structures can be exposed where oversight is uneven.
- False documentation and trade-based money laundering. Over‑ or under‑invoicing, sham shipments, misdeclared goods, and circular trade flows can be used to move value. Companies may be implicated if their supply chains or distributors are used to execute these schemes, even when the underlying product is legitimate.
Against this backdrop, certain operational areas tend to present the most significant and recurrent enforcement risks for multinationals. In practice, authorities often focus their scrutiny on whether criminal organizations have benefited from a company’s physical footprint, third‑party relationships, or payment flows, directly or indirectly. The following categories illustrate where these broader risks most commonly manifest:
- Material or Logistical Support Risk. The Shield of the Americas joint statement expressly contemplates criminal liability for persons who knowingly provide material or logistical support to targeted organizations. That formulation broadens the compliance inquiry materially. For companies operating in affected markets, the relevant question may not be limited to whether funds were transferred to a designated actor. Authorities may also scrutinize whether a company or its intermediaries provided transportation, warehousing, communications support, equipment, technology, or other forms of operational assistance that benefited a targeted organization, directly or indirectly. These issues may arise with particular acuity in jurisdictions or localities where criminal organizations exert influence over transport routes, ports, labor channels, security arrangements, or other aspects of ordinary commercial activity.
- Third-Party and Supply Chain Risk. For many multinationals, the most significant exposure will arise through third‑party relationships rather than direct interaction with a criminal organization. Distributors, customs brokers, freight forwarders, local consultants, security providers, labor contractors, and other intermediaries may themselves have links to criminal organizations or may make payments to such groups in order to continue operating in high‑risk environments. In such cases, enforcement scrutiny is likely to focus not only on what the company knew, but also on whether it had sufficient controls to identify and investigate warning signs. Where due diligence is limited, subcontracting chains are opaque, or business teams lack clear escalation protocols, a company may be exposed to sanctions, AML, customs, or related enforcement risk notwithstanding the absence of intentional misconduct.
- Payment, AML, and Financial Infrastructure Risk. Authorities are also increasingly focused on the financial and technological mechanisms through which criminal organizations move funds and disguise relationships. A recent OFAC action on September 9, 2026, is illustrative in this respect, as it targeted not only an alleged criminal organization but also entities said to support it through digital currency and associated services. Accordingly, companies should assess not only traditional banking relationships but also any reliance on alternative payment methods, digital‑asset channels, high‑risk intermediaries, or transaction structures that may obscure the identity of the true counterparty or the economic rationale for the payment. Requests to remit funds to unrelated third parties, unexplained service fees, unusual invoice patterns, or payments routed through unfamiliar jurisdictions may all warrant heightened scrutiny.
- Customs, Trade Compliance, and Port Risk. Criminal organizations frequently seek to influence border crossings and ports, where control over inspections, routing, and storage can be leveraged to move illicit goods or launder value. Exposure may arise where customs brokers or clearance agents have undisclosed ties to criminal groups; where shipments are consistently routed through specific ports or crossings associated with such organizations; or where “expediting” fees and facilitation payments mask extortion or smuggling arrangements. Regulators and law‑enforcement authorities may focus on whether a company’s import/export practices, documentation, and choice of intermediaries or routes have, in effect, enabled trade‑based money laundering, cargo diversion, or other forms of criminal‑organization activity.
- Security, Labor, and Local Interface Risk. In some markets, criminal organizations are embedded in local security structures, labor channels, and community arrangements. Multinationals may face heightened risk where private security firms, unions, labor contractors, or local trucking and site‑access providers are influenced or infiltrated by such groups, or where “community payments,” security fees, or informal levies effectively function as protection payments. Even if these arrangements are viewed locally as necessary to operate, regulators may treat them as material support if they benefit designated organizations or cartels, particularly where they are recurring, substantial, or closely tied to the company’s continued ability to move goods or maintain facilities.
Compliance Best Practices
Against this backdrop, companies with Latin America exposure should consider whether their existing compliance programs are sufficiently responsive to criminal-organization risk as it now presents itself in practice.
- Refresh Risk Assessments. Risk assessments should specifically address the ways in which criminal-organization exposure may arise through the company’s operations, transportation routes, ports of entry, customs interactions, distributors, labor channels, security arrangements, and payment flows in higher-risk jurisdictions. A generic sanctions or anti-corruption assessment may not adequately capture these dynamics.
- Apply Enhanced Due Diligence to High-Risk Third Parties. Third parties involved in logistics, customs clearance, transportation, security, labor, and other operationally sensitive functions should be subject to enhanced due diligence. In addition to list screening, companies should consider beneficial ownership review, adverse media checks, reference checks, and careful scrutiny of subcontracting practices and local operating models.
- Strengthen Ownership and Screening Controls. Companies should ensure that screening procedures can identify not only named designated persons but also potential ownership-based exposure. Internal processes should permit escalation where beneficial ownership is unclear, ownership structures change unexpectedly, or available information suggests that a counterparty may be owned or controlled by blocked persons.
- Tighten Payment Controls and Escalation Procedures. Finance and business teams should have clear, workable procedures for escalating unusual payment requests, including payments to unrelated parties, unexplained fees, cash demands, or transactions involving unfamiliar financial channels. These procedures should be sufficiently practical to function in real time, particularly where commercial teams are operating under pressure.
- Monitor Regional Developments, Not Only U.S. Measures. Given the prospect of increasing regional coordination, companies should avoid treating U.S. sanctions developments as the sole relevant benchmark. Monitoring should also encompass developments in relevant Latin American jurisdictions, including domestic sanctions measures, criminal-support provisions, immigration restrictions, and enforcement priorities that may affect business operations or counterparties.
- Embed Clear Escalation and Incident-Response Protocols. Beyond routine controls, companies should establish structured processes for responding when potential criminal‑organization exposure is identified. This includes defined triggers for escalation from local teams to regional or headquarters compliance, protocols for suspending transactions or counterparties pending review, and documented procedures for engaging legal counsel and, where appropriate, regulators or law‑enforcement authorities. Clear, practical playbooks can help ensure that concerns are addressed promptly and consistently rather than informally managed at the local level.
- Leverage Contractual Protections and Audit Rights. Third‑party contracts should reflect the heightened risk environment in relevant markets. Where feasible, agreements with distributors, customs brokers, logistics providers, security firms, and labor contractors should include express prohibitions on dealings with designated organizations, robust audit and access‑to‑information rights, obligations to disclose subcontractors, and mechanisms for investigation and termination where red flags arise. These provisions can provide both leverage and transparency when managing high‑risk relationships.
- Provide Practical, Role-Specific Training. Training should be tailored to the functions most likely to encounter these risks in practice, including procurement, logistics, treasury, compliance, security, and local management. Personnel should understand not only the formal rules, but also the operational red flags that may indicate exposure to a criminal organization or its support network.
These recent U.S. and regional developments signal that criminal‑organization risk in Latin America is no longer limited to a narrow set of designated traffickers or cartel leaders. Enforcement attention is expanding to the networks that support them — logistics providers, customs intermediaries, security and labor channels, financial infrastructure, and the commercial arrangements that enable them to operate. For multinationals, this means that traditional list‑based sanctions screening and generic compliance measures are unlikely to be sufficient on their own.
Companies with meaningful exposure to higher‑risk jurisdictions in the region should treat criminal‑organization risk as a distinct and evolving category within their broader sanctions, AML, and third‑party due diligence frameworks. That will typically require more granular risk assessments, enhanced diligence on operationally critical intermediaries, stronger ownership and payment controls, and sustained monitoring of regional enforcement trends. By proactively adapting programs now, multinationals can better manage the growing complexity of the enforcement landscape — and reduce the likelihood that ordinary business operations will be viewed, in hindsight, as having facilitated criminal organizations or their support networks.
If you have questions about this topic, please feel free to reach out to any of the authors or your Foley & Lardner attorney. If you would like to see future updates regarding “What Every Multinational Company Should Know” about operating in today’s complicated international trade world, please sign up for our Tariff & International Trade blog — click here to register.