The Seventh Circuit to Issue First Appellate Decision Holding That Text Messages Are Not Covered By Do-Not-Call Provisions of the TCPA

For decades, courts in TCPA litigation assumed that text messages qualify as “telephone call[s]” under Section 227(c)(5) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), relying primarily on FCC regulations. That assumption now faces serious challenges. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025), a growing number of courts have taken a fresh look at the statutory text and held that “text messages” are not covered by Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA authorizing claims for violations of the federal Do-Not-Call rules. Most notably, on July 14, 2026, the Seventh Circuit issued a ruling in a published case, Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 at *5 (7th Cir. 2026), which is the first federal appellate decision to weigh in on whether text messages are “telephone calls” for purposes of Section 227(c)(5) post-McLaughlin.

The McLaughlin Sea Change

Foley & Lardner first reported on the implications of McLaughlin after the decision came out in June 2025. In short, McLaughlin scaled back the deference courts afforded to federal agency interpretations. Under the prior Chevron framework, courts routinely deferred to the FCC’s position that the TCPA’s restrictions on unsolicited telephone calls extended to text messages. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e). McLaughlin instructed courts to afford “proper respect” to agency interpretations rather than automatic deference, empowering independent statutory interpretation.

That shift traces directly to the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which formally overruled the Chevron doctrine after forty years. The Court held that “[t]he Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 391–92. McLaughlin applied Loper Bright to hold that district courts must independently determine the meaning of the TCPA’s provisions rather than treating FCC interpretations — including the FCC’s longstanding position that text messages qualify as “calls” — as binding.

Now, any pre-McLaughlin TCPA decision resting primarily on FCC deference is weakened authority. With FCC deference weakened, courts are now building their analysis from the ground up, starting with the statutory text itself.

The Statutory Text Does Not Define “Telephone Call[s] To Include Texts”

Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA creates a private right of action for those who have received “more than one telephone call within any 12-month period,” but says nothing about texts. The TCPA itself does not define “telephone call” to include text messages. On July 14, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit joined the growing chorus of district courts in holding that “[r]epeated, unwanted text messages . . . do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5).” Steidinger v. Blackstone Med. Servs., No. 25-2398, — F.3d — , 2026 WL 2028517, at *5 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026).

The Steidinger court reinforced this textual conclusion by looking to the TCPA’s broader structure and history. The Court observed that the subsections surrounding § 227(c)(5) (i.e., § 227 (c)(1-4)) consistently use the term “telephone solicitation,” which the TCPA defines to include “the initiation of a telephone call or message,” whereas § 227(c)(5) itself is limited to “telephone call.” 2026 WL 2028517, at *3. Applying the meaningful-variation canon, the court presumed that Congress’s use of a narrower term in § 227(c)(5) than in the neighboring subsections was deliberate, and that “telephone call” and “message” must refer to different forms of communication. Id. (citing Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 457–58 (2022); Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 414 (2019)). The court found this reading reinforced by § 227(d)(1), the TCPA’s fax provision, which shows that Congress in 1991, already understood text-based communications transmitted over a telephone line to be “messages,” not “calls.” Id. The court likewise rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Congress’s silence on text messages in § 227(c)(5) reflected tacit approval of the FCC’s contrary interpretation, noting that Congress amended § 227(e) in 2018 to expressly define and cover “text message[s]” while leaving § 227(c)(5) untouched — a choice that, if anything, cuts against inferring that “telephone call” already encompassed texts. Id. at *4–*5 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001) and Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. 405, 424 (2017)). Taken together, the court concluded both the statute’s structure and its legislative history confirm that § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action does not extend to unwanted text messages.

Plain Meaning at the Time of Enactment Suggests That Calls Are Not the Same as Texts

Steidinger further emphasized that the ordinary meaning of “telephone call” in 1991 referred exclusively to voice communication. At that time, “a telephone was ‘[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.’” 2026 WL 2028517, at *2 (quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991)). And a call meant “to get or try to get into communication by telephone.” Id. Thus, as the Steidinger court noted, in 1991, a “telephone call” referred to communication via sound.

TCPA plaintiffs argue that modern usage treats “call” and “text” interchangeably, but statutory interpretation looks to meaning at enactment, not how language has evolved since. And even in contemporary usage, people routinely distinguish “I’ll call you” from “I’ll text you.”

Congressional Inaction Creates a Space for Judicial Interpretation

Congress has amended the TCPA four times (2005, 2010, 2015, 2019) without expressly adopting the FCC’s position that text messages constitute “telephone call[s]” for purposes of Section 227(c)(5). For example, Congress has changed other portions of § 227 to clarify that text messages are covered. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, § 503(a), § 227(e)(1), (e)(8), 132 Stat. 348, 1091-92 (2018) (amending § 227(e) to cover text messages and defining “text message” for purposes of that subsection). Congress could have done so for purposes of § 227(c)(5), but it did not.

The Seventh Circuit is the first court of appeals to definitively address whether Section 227(c)(5) applies to text messages post-McLaughlin,while district courts have been divided into two camps. Notably, months before Steidinger was decided, the Ninth Circuit held that under Section 227(b)(1) — the TCPA’s separate prohibition on autodialed and prerecorded-voice calls — “a text message is properly deemed to be a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA.” Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119, 1123–25 (9th Cir. 2026). The court reasoned that a text message fits the “plain and ordinary meaning” of “call” as “an attempt to communicate by telephone,” id. at 1123–24 (quoting Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953 n.3, 954 (9th Cir. 2009)), and that treating texts as calls serves the TCPA’s privacy-protective purpose because an incoming text creates “an immediate intrusion on privacy comparable to that associated with the ring of an incoming auto-dialed phone call,” id. at 1124.

Although Steidinger distinguished Howard as arising under a different statutory provision — since Section 227(b)’s use of “call” is not the same as Section 227(c)(5)’s “telephone call” — the decision illustrates that the underlying question of whether a text message can be a telephone “call” at all remains unsettled and may ultimately require Supreme Court review.

Implications for TCPA Defendants

For businesses defending Section 227(c)(5) claims based on text messaging, this developing case law opens a potentially powerful defense strategy. Defendants may now have viable grounds to challenge whether Section 227(c)(5) allows plaintiffs to sue over text messages at all — particularly in jurisdictions where courts have shown willingness to engage with statutory text arguments post-McLaughlin.[1]

The stakes are substantial. TCPA claims carry statutory damages of $500 to $1,500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), meaning class actions involving millions of texts can create enormous exposure. The post-McLaughlin recalibration of administrative deference has opened a window for defendants that many thought permanently closed, especially in light of the Steidinger decision. For businesses facing TCPA exposure based on text messaging, this evolving case law presents a meaningful opportunity to challenge liability at the outset of class action litigation. Please contact the authors of this article if you would like to discuss your particular situation further.

[1]It is important to note that the holding in Steidinger does not impact other provisions of the TCPA, including those governing autodialed calls and prerecorded or artificial voice messages under Section 227(b). State law analogues to the TCPA are similarly unaffected, and many states expressly extend their telemarketing and do-not-call protections to text messages.

Disclaimer

This blog is made available by Foley & Lardner LLP (“Foley” or “the Firm”) for informational purposes only. It is not meant to convey the Firm’s legal position on behalf of any client, nor is it intended to convey specific legal advice. Any opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of Foley & Lardner LLP, its partners, or its clients. Accordingly, do not act upon this information without seeking counsel from a licensed attorney. This blog is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Communicating with Foley through this website by email, blog post, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship for any legal matter. Therefore, any communication or material you transmit to Foley through this blog, whether by email, blog post or any other manner, will not be treated as confidential or proprietary. The information on this blog is published “AS IS” and is not guaranteed to be complete, accurate, and or up-to-date. Foley makes no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied, as to the operation or content of the site. Foley expressly disclaims all other guarantees, warranties, conditions and representations of any kind, either express or implied, whether arising under any statute, law, commercial use or otherwise, including implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Foley or any of its partners, officers, employees, agents or affiliates be liable, directly or indirectly, under any theory of law (contract, tort, negligence or otherwise), to you or anyone else, for any claims, losses or damages, direct, indirect special, incidental, punitive or consequential, resulting from or occasioned by the creation, use of or reliance on this site (including information and other content) or any third party websites or the information, resources or material accessed through any such websites. In some jurisdictions, the contents of this blog may be considered Attorney Advertising. If applicable, please note that prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Photographs are for dramatization purposes only and may include models. Likenesses do not necessarily imply current client, partnership or employee status.